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in the Roman Republic, ed. Cristina Rosillo López, Historia Einzelschrift 256, Steiner 
2019: 41-58. 
 
The populus Romanus as the source of public opinion1 
 
The public and the populus 
 
One of the reasons that public opinion can be so hard to define or measure is the inherent 
complexity of the concept of ‘public’ or ‘the public’. Who is part of this group, and who is 
excluded? In English usage, the boundaries are often fuzzy. One answer would be to say that 
‘the public’ includes everyone: young, old, male, female, citizen or non-citizen. But when a 
modern British or American politician claims that ‘the public’ supports a policy, he or she is 
arguably excluding any opponents from the group constituting ‘the public’. If challenged, the 
politician would presumably say that he or she does not mean that every single person 
supports the policy, but that a large number of people do, and perhaps even a majority. The 
ambiguity of the English phrase ‘the public’ helps the politician’s rhetoric: appeal to a 
particular group of supporters is framed in a way which suggests consensus or even 
unanimity. 
 
For the Roman Republic, the situation is in some ways clearer. In English, ‘the public’ is 
defined with reference to the adjective ‘public’. In Latin, the adjective publicus is not self-
explanatory. Instead, things that are publicus are defined with reference to an institution 
which is also a group of people, the populus Romanus.2 It is rare that people who are not 
members of the populus are even part of the discussion. The clear and direct link between 
populus and publicus extends as far as the res publica itself: the famous phrase Cicero 
attributes to Scipio in his de Republica defines res publica as res populi.3 In practice, too, the 
                                                 
1 My thanks to Cristina Rosillo López for her support, encouragement, and editorial suggestions. I can only 
regret that I have not been able to engage more thoroughly with her published work in Rosillo López 2017a, 
which appeared as this paper was in its final stages. I also owe thanks to all participants at the Seville 
conference, and to Eleanor Cowan and the participants at the ‘Rule of Law’ symposium in Sydney in January 
2017, where I was able to explore and get feedback on a range of related ideas. Translations are my own. 
2 The archaic spelling of publicus is poplicus (e.g. the S.C. de Bacchanalibus, CIL 10.104, line 15); see further 
Russell 2016a: 26-7. 
3 Cic. Rep. 1.39; as Hodgson 2017: 7 points out, Cicero finds it sufficient for his definition of res publica to 
define populus. On Cicero’s phrase and its meanings, see further Schofield 1995; Asmis 2004; Grilli 2005; 
Atkins 2013: 128-38. 
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populus Romanus is often treated as equivalent to what we might call ‘the state’. Romans 
wrote socii populi Romani where we would translate ‘Rome’s allies’; it was the populus 
Romanus, rather than Rome or the res publica, who conquered the world.4  
 
The populus Romanus was also a vital part of internal political discourse. The modern 
concept of sovereignty may not map perfectly onto the Roman Republic, but the populus was 
indisputably the closest thing that Rome had to a sovereign body.5 It was the original holder 
of the potestas and imperium which was later passed to the princeps (Dig. 1.4.1pr = Ulpian 1 
fr. 1916).6 In a formulation Livy attributes to the Twelve Tables, quodcumque postremum 
populus iussisset, id ius ratumque esset: ‘whatever the populus has last ordered, this is to be 
law and ratified’ (Liv. 7.17.12).7 The populus Romanus was the source of law, as well as the 
ultimate arbiter of elections. It should come as no surprise, then, that we read often in our 
Republican sources about what the populus Romanus thinks or wants, as well as what it 
orders. For Romans, the group of people constituting ‘the public’ could, in certain situations, 
be clearly and narrowly defined: they were the members of the populus Romanus, the 
institution from which the concept of publicness itself was derived.8  
 
The central role of the populus Romanus in Roman politics had consequences for how 
Romans understood, reacted to, and manipulated public opinion, and those consequences will 
be the subject of this chapter. I concentrate on the language and concepts used by orators in 
their speeches to the people, the definitive “public”. When they positioned the populus 
Romanus as the sole political public audience, Roman political discourse and the politicians 
who used it also defined the populus Romanus as the sole source of legitimate public 
opinion.9  
                                                 
4 One of the most rhetorically polished examples comes at Cic. Div. in Caec. 69: iure tum florebat populi 
Romani nomen, iure auctoritas huius imperi civitatisque maiestas gravis habebatur. The second half of the 
phrase is not an addition, but an explanation of the first: auctoritas huius imperi and civitatis maiestas are facets 
of populi Romani nomen. 
5 The Roman Republic was governed as much by mos maiorum as Staatsrecht, making it difficult to apply 
legalistic modern conceptions of sovereignty. See further Hammer 2015. 
6 The cautions of Ando 2013 must be born in mind: imperial-period rationalizations like these say more about 
the empire and the need to make sense of monarchy than they do about Republican realities.  
7 Crawford 1996: 721 reads this clause merely as a statement that newer legislation outranks old, rather than as a 
claim to popular sovereignty; but see e.g. Straumann 2016: 37-8. 
8 Hodgson 2017: 10-11 asks why at Rep. 1.41, in the middle of his definitions of the res publica, Cicero makes 
Scipio take a convoluted route to defining the civitas with reference to the populus, rather than the obvious 
etymological shortcut from cives. The unavoidable centrality of the populus Romanus to conceptions of 
publicity and public life must be one answer. 
9 My use of the word ‘legitimate’ here draws not on Weber but on Habermas’s idea of the legitimizing force of 
public opinion: for him, the formation of bourgeois Öffentlichkeit allows private citizens to “compel public 
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The orator, the populus Romanus, and legitimate public opinion 
 
There was always a gap between the rhetoric of the populus Romanus and the reality. Despite 
the lip service politicians played to the sovereign populus Romanus, Roman political life was 
always to a greater or lesser extent dominated by a tiny minority, the elite. Another gap, more 
pertinent to this chapter, lay between the august, abstract institution of the populus Romanus 
called upon in political rhetoric and the reality of the hundreds of thousands of citizens who 
collectively formed it. The populus Romanus as a whole never voted or had their opinions 
consulted. Participation was restricted to those who could be in the right place at the right 
time to cast a ballot or hear a speech. Indeed, the groups who did so were small and 
unrepresentative. The physical spaces of politics could not accommodate more than a few 
thousand participants. Those participants needed to live in or have the funds to travel to 
Rome, and be able to take a day away from paid employment. More generally, they had to 
care enough to show up.10  
 
The disjunction between the abstract sovereign populus and the reality of a few hundred or 
thousand men standing in front of the Rostra has been well explored by previous scholarship. 
This was the central fiction of Roman political culture: a Roman Republican orator treated 
his audience, however small and unrepresentative it might be, as exactly equal to the populus 
Romanus.11 The fiction goes beyond the contio: the Roman ideology of publicity, in which 
certain acts had to be performed in public view, the electoral process, and much more, 
depended on everyone agreeing to understand that the group that happened to be present that 
day was in fact identical with the populus Romanus.  
 
                                                 
authority to legitimate itself before public opinion” (Habermas 1991: 25-6, in the MIT Press edition translated 
by Thomas Burger). This definition is not so far from another Habermasian concept tackled by Hurlet in this 
volume: a form of public opinion which can critique or even oppose power. Hurlet concludes, rightly, that this 
form never existed at Rome. But my weaker formulation allows for common ground between parts of 
Habermas’s concept and Roman political culture. Roman political authority was drawn from the populus 
Romanus, and all political action had to be legitimated before the populus, in what Millar 1998: 45 calls an 
“ideology of publicity”. In this chapter, moreover, I am less concerned with the requirement for legitimation by 
the populus than the reverse: only the populus had the power to bestow legitimacy. I use the phrase “legitimate 
public opinion”, therefore, to mean public opinion before which authority can and must legitimate itself.  
10 For discussion of the size and composition of Roman political crowds, see Mouritsen 2001: 18-37; Jehne 
2006. 
11 Hölkeskamp 1995: 13; Hölkeskamp 2013. 
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One consequence of this fiction was that the populus Romanus, as called into being by an 
elite orator, could think or vote different ways on different occasions, not just because of the 
fickleness of crowds bewailed by Cicero at pro Cluentio 137-8 or pro Murena 36, but 
because it was composed of entirely different people. Henrik Mouritsen and Robert Morstein-
Marx have demonstrated that the audience of a contio was mostly likely to be composed of 
the speakers’ partisans; his rival’s contio on the same subject, with a completely different 
makeup, would naturally adopt a different view.12 And yet, if we follow the inbuilt 
assumptions of Roman political culture, both were the populus Romanus, with a sovereign 
power that should be respected. 
 
Politicians were therefore faced with a problem at moments when the populus Romanus, in 
the version called into being by an opponent’s speech or voting assembly, appeared to have 
an opinion which ran counter to their own. In our surviving evidence (which is, of course, 
largely Ciceronian), the tactic chosen to deal with the problem is almost always the same. 
Rather than impugning the opinion of any part of the populus Romanus, Cicero argues that 
the audience whose view he is aiming to discredit was not the populus Romanus at all. The 
best-known example comes from the de Domo 89-90, where Cicero calls Clodius’ supporters 
multitudinem hominum ex servis, ex conductis, ex facinerosis, ex egentibus congregatam (‘a 
mob of men gathered together from slaves, hirelings, criminals, destitutes’, 89), and contrasts 
them with the pulchritudo populi Romani, the ‘beauty of the populus Romanus’ who voted to 
recall him from exile. Do you really think, he asks Clodius, that your mob is the populus 
Romanus?13 No, he implies, it is not – and when Clodius must face the true populus, the 
verus populus (Sest. 108), he gets a rougher hearing. 
 
The post-exile speeches are full of such rhetoric. The crowds of Cicero’s opponents, he 
claims, are composed of men who cannot be considered members of the populus Romanus, 
either because as slaves or foreigners they are literally non-citizens or because they have 
abdicated their citizen rights through accepting bribes or more general moral turpitude. He 
sometimes shades into impugning the size of the crowds as well as their composition: at pro 
Sestio 53 he claims that the law exiling him was passed vastato ac relicto foro et sicariis 
servisque tradito – ‘in an empty and abandoned Forum, handed over to murderers and 
                                                 
12 Mouritsen 2001, esp. 50-2; Morstein-Marx 2004: 128-36. In general on the operation of the contio, see Pina 
Polo 1996. 
13 I have discussed this example at length in Russell 2016b. 
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slaves’. But the main point remains that this group is entirely distinct from the populus, as a 
parallel argument earlier in the speech points out:  
cum isdem operis suffragium ferentibus, eodem gladiatore latore, vacuo non modo a 
bonis sed etiam a liberis atque inani foro, ignaro populo Romano quid ageretur (Red. 
Sen. 18) 
…when the same gangs were casting their votes with the same gladiator proposing the 
bills, in an unoccupied Forum empty not only of good men but even of free men, and 
the populus Romanus did not know what was going on… 
Clodius’ supporters are contrasted with the populus Romanus, who are innocent of and 
ignorant of what is being done. There is no overlap. The voters were slaves rather than 
citizens, and even they were few. But it is their (supposed) status, not their numbers, that 
means he can define them as outside the populus Romanus. 
 
The votes of the populus Romanus, and of no other group, had legal force.14 The legal status 
of the voters is relevant to Cicero’s attack partly because in this and many other such salvos, 
Cicero is attempting to discredit and delegitimise specific laws Clodius had succeeded in 
passing. He takes a scattershot approach, pointing to errors in their drafting, procedural 
errors, and even religious impediments; complaining that the votes were compromised 
because the voters were not citizens forms one more argument along the same lines.15 But 
Cicero’s concern to define Clodius’ followers as outside the populus Romanus goes beyond 
his desire to vitiate any individual law. He calls into question the legitimacy of their opinions 
as much as the legitimacy of their votes. 
 
Cicero’s interest in who is or is not a member goes well beyond voting assemblies and 
contiones. When it suits him, he can even look for the populus Romanus in the theatres and 
games.16 The comitia and contiones, he contends, are sometimes vitiatae atque corruptae: 
                                                 
14 The difference between the populus and the plebs will not concern me here; Jehne 2014: 118-9 has a recent 
overview. I justify skipping over such an important distinction partly because Cicero does so himself, in the 
passages already quoted and elsewhere. Whenever he attacks Clodius’ contiones or legislation because the 
group present were not the true populus Romanus, he is technically correct: since Clodius was a tribune of the 
plebs, they were in fact the concilium plebis. But his attacks consistently refer to the populus, of which the plebs 
were a subset. 
15 In greatest detail at de Domo 32-55. 
16 The best demonstration of this approach could be pro Sestio 106: nunc, nisi me fallit, in eo statu civitas est ut, 
si operas conductorum removeris, omnes idem de re publica sensuri esse videantur. etenim tribus locis 
significari maxime de <re publica> populi Romani iudicium ac voluntas potest, contione, comitiis, ludorum 
gladiatorumque consessu. The operas conductorum are defined as outside the populus Romanus, whose 
iudicium and voluntas – legitimate public opinion – can be seen at assemblies, elections, and at the games. 
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‘fraudulent and corrupted’ (Sest. 115): as he has complained repeatedly in the surrounding 
passages, they can be infiltrated by hired mobs (operas conductorum, Sest. 106). In the 
theatre, on the other hand, though hired claques are common, there can be occasions when it 
is clear what the populus Romanus thinks (Sest. 117): of course, they support Cicero and the 
senate, and boo Clodius. The theatrical audience could pass no law, but he nevertheless he 
invokes them as the populus Romanus in order to claim that this demonstration, and not the 
reactions of Clodius’ contional crowds, is the truest expression of public opinion.17 He caps 
his discussion with a rhetorical question: videtisne igitur quantum <intersit> inter populum 
Romanum et contionem?18 “Do you see, therefore, how much difference there is between the 
populus Romanus and a contio?” In a political culture which automatically defined the contio 
as the populus Romanus, this was a radical piece of rhetoric. But its radical force was derived 
from existing ideals about the populus Romanus and its role. Clodius, Cicero argues, has 
turned the world upside down, to the point where public opinion must be sought not in the 
assemblies but at the games; but his claim about the legitimacy of the crowd’s opinions, just 
like the legitimacy of their votes, depends on defining them as no more and no less than the 
populus Romanus itself. The populus Romanus is not only the sole source of law, but the sole 
source of legitimate public opinion. 
 
When Cicero denies a crowd the name of populus Romanus, he preserves his opponents’ 
claims in negative. Clodius and his allies used the same rhetoric: they identified their 
audiences as the populus Romanus, and their opinions as legitimate. 
at uero ille praetor, qui de me non patris, aui, proaui, maiorum denique suorum 
omnium, sed Graeculorum instituto contionem interrogare solebat, uelletne me 
redire, et, cum erat reclamatum semiuiuis mercennariorum uocibus, populum 
Romanum negare dicebat. (Sest. 126) 
                                                 
Unfortunately, the passage is corrupt. The majority of the manuscripts read de p. R. iudicium, which if expanded 
into de populi Romani iudicium needs some editing to make sense. Either de re publica populi Romani iudicium 
(Baiter) or simply populi Romani iudicium (deleting the de, as some of the manuscripts do) would support my 
interpretation; Mommsen, however, suggested that the correct reading should be de r. p. iudicium, to be 
expanded de re publica iudicium, with no specific reference to the populus. On the textual issue see further 
Kaster 2006: 331-2. In general on expressions of public opinions at spectacles, see Nicolet 1980: 361-73. 
17 It is important to remember, of course, that Cicero’s aim in this passage is not to elucidate political theory but 
to advance his own cause. The criteria Cicero is using to make his judgements, never particularly well 
concealed, are unusually patent in this passage: those who agree with him always count as the true populus 
Romanus, while those who disagree never do. On the surface, he argues that the populus Romanus is present at 
the theatre, and that the opinions of theatre crows are therefore legitimate and should be taken into account. But 
the concealed logic of his speech goes in exactly the opposite direction: the crowd at the theatre expresses an 
opinion of which he approves, so he finds their opinion legitimate, so he anoints them as the populus Romanus. 
18 Intersit is missing from the manuscripts, but is required by the context; it was supplied by Wesenberg. 
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 But that praetor [Appius Claudius], who tends to ask questions of the contio about me 
not in the manner of his father, grandfather, great-grandfather, or indeed his entire 
family line, but like some little Greek, asked them whether they wanted me to come 
back; and when the shout of ‘no!’ came in the half-dead voices of hirelings he 
claimed that the populus Romanus said they did not want it. 
Again, we see Cicero dismiss Appius Claudius’ audience as hired men, and not even 
particularly enthusiastic ones at that. Appius, however, explicitly claims that this group are 
the populus Romanus, and that their shouts give him a mandate to oppose Cicero’s recall. 
Politicians at both ends of the spectrum made use of the legitimizing force that invocation of 
the populus Romanus could bring to expressions of public opinion. 
 
The nature of the populus Romanus 
 
The virtuoso ways in which Cicero and his contemporaries defined their audiences as the 
populus Romanus have already been discussed by Robert Morstein-Marx, in more detail than 
is possible here.19 He explores in more detail than is possible here how the orator 
disenfranchises those with whom he does not agree and dismisses any crowd response hostile 
to him as corrupt, while embracing any sign of support (or indeed silence) as a favourable 
and unanimous expression of the true populus’ opinion. In the sections that follow, I aim to 
build on Morstein-Marx’s conclusions by asking why this rhetorical strategy was so common 
and effective. Why did orators risk alienating potential voters by calling them slaves and 
hirelings? It was not the only option available: they might instead have argued that their 
opponents had misread the popular mood, or that the objectionable views of the crowds in 
question did not reflect the majority opinion. Further analysis shows that the choice to define 
opponents as outside the populus was not just a rhetorical tool: it was based on a fundamental 
structuring principle of Roman political culture that deserves attention. 
 
It was clearly in the Republican orator’s interest to claim that public opinion was unanimous 
in his favour, and that any dissenting voices therefore must belong to people outside the 
‘public’ as Roman political culture defined it, i.e. the populus Romanus. But the fact that the 
populus and thus public opinion was almost always presented in unified agreement was not 
only a consequence of rhetorical choices, or even of the ideological power of consensus in 
                                                 
19 Morstein-Marx 2004: 119-59. 
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Roman discourse.20 The indivisible unity of the populus itself was a structuring factor prior to 
any of these. The Latin word implied far more than just a group of people or the citizenry 
taken as a whole. It probably originally meant the army, reminding us of the origins of 
citizen’s rights in their military contributions; like the army, it was an institution, with its own 
internal and external structure.21 References to the populus Romanus in less formal settings, 
including (as we shall see) as passing onlookers to a trial or even just as the general public, 
were understood with reference to the populus Romanus in its full institutional form, 
summoned by a magistrate and divided into classes, centuries, and tribes.22 Roman concepts 
analogous to the English ‘public’ were derived from this institution, rather than vice versa. 
 
One defining characteristic of the populus Romanus in Latin is its stubborn indivisibility.23 
We know and the Romans knew that the people who made up the populus were often divided 
on an issue, or even polarised. But Latin authors hardly ever use the technical term populus 
when discussing internal division: we do not hear that half the populus thinks one thing, 
while the other half thinks another.24 The populus Romanus is singular; it has one voice and 
one opinion.  
 
The populus’ indivisibility is best demonstrated by looking at the rare exceptions, which are 
all treated as serious threats to the civic and even cosmic order. Livy’s scortum nobile 
(probably best translated ‘tart-with-a-heart’, 39.9.5) Hispala Faecennia, who reveals the 
Baccanalian conspiracy of 186 BCE, describes the crowd gathered for the rites as alterum 
iam prope populum – “almost a second populus” (39.13.14). The obvious meaning of her 
phrase is that the crowd was large, but Livy’s choice of the word populus adds further 
overtones. Hispala is a foreign-born woman and a freed slave, and perhaps Livy is 
                                                 
20 Important recent contributions on the concept of consensus include Flower 2014; Flaig 2013. 
21 See further Jehne 2014: 120-3. For discussion of the word’s origin, see TLL ad. loc.; Momigliano 1969; Stark 
1967: 57-57. The archaic meaning ‘army’ is suggested by the fact that the dictator was originally called the 
magister populi, which by comparison with the magister equitum we could translate ‘the leader of the infantry’ 
(Varr. Ling. 5.82; Cic. Rep. 1.63, Leg. 3.9; Sen. Ep. 108.31), and the link with the verb populor, ‘devastate’.  
22 See, for example, Cic. Rep. 3.45: an untrammelled, disordered democratic mob is no populus at all. This 
feature of Roman political discourse naturally served to reproduce elite power. Thus Connolly 2007: 40-1 
discusses how only an group organised and led by the elite can be thought of as exercising political power; 
O'Neill 2003 explores the circuli, informal discussion groups, as alternative (and dangerously multiple) loci for 
political activity, and the ways in which the elite aimed to delegitimize and suppress them.  
23 It is possible to speak of plural populi in the same way as we in English might say ‘peoples’: the populi of 
various nations (e.g. Cic. Verr. 2.3.207, omnes liberi populi). 
24 The practice of voting itself, which seems designed to recognise diversity of opinion, was in Rome a vehicle 
for producing consensus, if not unanimity; voting stopped after a majority was reached, and the total number of 
votes on each side was not published. The result was announced as the decision of the populus Romanus. See 
further Jehne 2003. 
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deliberately characterising her as unused to the vocabulary of politics; but even she knows 
that to talk of a second populus makes no sense and has to be marked as metaphor with 
prope, “almost”. The force of the metaphor is devastating: this alternative populus, composed 
irregularly of both men and women, forms an existential threat to the Roman state. In part its 
foreign and female members make it something akin to a foreign invader, a different people 
or race (or, indeed, army) here to wage war against the populus Romanus. And yet at the 
same time its most insidious quality is that it is partially composed of respectable Roman men 
like the young initiate Aebutius: it is an alternative populus, based on different relations of 
power and internal hierarchy, which threatens not to conquer but to replace the true populus.  
 
 In his de Republica, Cicero assembles a cast of venerable statesmen of the generations 
immediately before his own for a fictional meeting at Scipio’s villa, imagined as taking place 
in the year 129 BCE. He sets the scene by making them talk of other matters before the 
discussion turns to politics, and an early topic of conversation is a recent astronomical 
phenomenon: Tubero asks Scipio what he thinks of the recent report that a second sun 
appeared in the sky (1.15). The conversation continues for several paragraphs, until finally 
Laelius objects: 
quid enim mihi… quaerit quo modo duo soles visi sint, non quaerit cur in una re 
publica duo senatus et duo paene iam populi sint? nam ut videtis mors Tiberii 
Gracchi et iam ante tota illius ratio tribunatus divisit populum unum in duas partis… 
Why does he ask me how it could be that two suns were seen, and he does not ask me 
why in one res publica there are two senates and almost two populi? For as you can 
see, the death of Tiberius Gracchus and before that the whole operation of his 
tribunate has divided one populus into two parts… (Cic. Rep. 1.31) 
The idea that the populus Romanus could be divided into two parts is treated as a portent of 
cosmic significance, more unusual and striking than the idea that there could be two suns in 
the sky. Laelius’ question, with its contrast between una re publica and duo populi, implies 
that such a development is a contradiction in terms, something that should be impossible. 
And even within this thought experiment he hedges his claim, like Livy’s Hispala, marking it 
as metaphor with paene the first time he introduces it.  
 
The third and final example of late Republican or early imperial Latin referring in any way to 
a divided populus comes, like the first, in words a Roman author places into a foreign mouth. 
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When Caesar demands that Massilia offer him support upon the outbreak of the civil war, 
they refuse: 
intellegere se divisum esse populum Romanum in partes duas; neque sui iudicii neque 
suarum esse virium discernere, utra pars iustiorem habeat causam. 
They said that they understood that the populus Romanus was divided into two parts: 
it was beyond their judgment and strength to decide which part had the more just 
cause. (Caes. BC 1.35) 
As it turns out, their excuse is insincere: they have already agreed to help Domitius. But their 
argument once again shows how a divided populus Romanus is a fundamental contradiction 
and can only lead to disaster: neither of the two parts can claim legitimacy. It should not be 
surprising that this most definitive statement of the divided populus comes in 49 BCE: a 
populus in two parts means civil war and, indeed, the end of the Republic as Cicero knew it. 
 
Further into the imperial period, talk of a divided populus becomes less threatening. Tacitus 
(Hist. 1.4) can contrast the pars populi integra et magnis domibus adnexa (“the uncorrupt 
part of the populus, linked to the great houses”), who were filled with hope by Nero’s death, 
with the plebs sordida et circo ac theatris sueta, simul deterrimi servorum (“the squalid plebs 
and those who frequented the circus and theatres, and the worst of the slaves too”), who 
mourned him. As has been noted before, his diction draws on Livy’s depiction of the internal 
strife of 304 BCE, when a certain Gnaeus Flavius had attracted popularity among the lowly.25 
But there are important differences between the two passages that have not previously been 
explored. Livy writes: 
ex eo tempore in duas partes discessit civitas; aliud integer populus, fautor et cultor 
bonorum, aliud forensis factio tenebat (Liv. 9.46) 
From that time forward the civitas was divided into two parts: the uncorrupted 
populus, which favoured and supported the good men, wanted one thing, while the 
Forum clique wanted another. 
Livy’s words are reminiscent of Cicero’s rhetorical technique: the morally compromised 
forensis factio are excluded from the populus. They were technically citizens, but by 
distancing themselves from the integer, uncorrupted populus they gave up any right to the 
                                                 
25 Heubner 1963 ad loc. 
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name. For Tacitus, only part of the populus is uncorrupted. For Livy, however, although the 
civitas, the citizenry, may be divided, the populus cannot be.26  
 
The indivisibility of the populus Romanus may thus remind us more of Habermasian 
Öffentlichkeit than any English concept of the “the public”.27  Frédéric Hurlet’s paper in this 
volume takes on Habermas’ theories of bourgeois and representative Öffentlichkeit and the 
their applicability to the Roman world in detail. For my purposes, one aspect of Habermas’s 
use of terminology, broadly applicable across the variety of forms of Öffentlichkeit he 
describes, is enough. For Habermas, Öffentlichkeit (of whatever kind) is singular and 
indivisible. In part, this is a consequence of the German term, the meaning of which we must 
struggle to express in English by shuttling between abstractions such as “the public sphere” 
or “the public realm”, but also “the public audience” and even merely “the public”.28 The 
plural Öffentlichkeiten is almost completely unattested outside contemporary (post-
Habermasian) works of high theory taking on these very questions. But its indivisibility is 
also a deliberate foundation of Habermas’ approach, coming to fruition only in his discussion 
of bourgeois Öffentlichkeit. For him, Öffentlichkeit is the sole source of legitimacy of public 
opinion, just as the populus Romanus was.29 
 
The Roman orator’s choice to disenfranchise his opponents, defining them as outside the 
populus and thus outside those whose opinion counted as legitimate public opinion, was a 
rhetorical masterstroke and served his political ends well. But it should also be seen as a 
consequence of the fundamental unity of the populus Romanus in Roman political discourse, 
a feature that was arguably prior to many of the political norms that developed over the 
course of the middle and late Republic. This fundamental unity structured some of the 
                                                 
26 On this episode, and the vocabulary and implications of political polarization at Rome more generally, see 
Hillard 2005: 4-9. For the divided civitas, compare Varro ap. Non. Marc. 3.128 (reflected by Florus 2.5), that 
Gaius Graccus created a bicipitem civitatem; Sall. Jug. 30 also refers to pars… pars civitatis.  
27 Habermas’ bourgeois Öffentlichkeit is historically located in a far later period, and not everything he says is 
applicable to the ancient world; for Habermas’ own treatment of the pre-modern, see Hurlet in this volume. But 
the singular nature of Öffentlichkeit, even when not used in a technical Habermasian sense, makes it easier for 
scholars writing in German to capture some aspects of how Roman Republican political discourse constitutes a 
singular and indivisible public – though, for the same reasons, they may not feel it demands so much 
explanation. See for example Hölkeskamp 2004: 70-1. 
28 On translating Öffentlichkeit, Mah 2000; and Hurlet in this volume. 
29 Hurlet notes that some aspects of Habermasian bourgeois public opinion, founded on a notion of “reason” 
specific to the post-Enlightenment context, cannot be reconciled with the world of the Roman Republic. Rome 
certainly had public opinion with legitimating force (for which see n.9 above), but its legitimation was not based 
on reason; indeed, the role of the populus Romanus and its performative demonstrations of consent is more 
reminiscent of Habermas’ earlier, representative Öffentlichkeit. 
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unusual features of the operation of what we might call ‘public opinion’ in Roman political 
rhetoric.  
 
Exploiting the difference 
 
The essential unity of the populus Romanus was at the core of Roman Republican political 
rhetoric. And yet the obvious and undeniable difference between the single ideal populus 
Romanus and the reality of the citizenry made for both problems and opportunities for the 
politician. As the first sections of this paper demonstrated, a politician could make use of the 
differences between the abstract populus Romanus and any given group of people, 
particularly by identifying people who disagreed with them as outside the populus. The 
public opinion Cicero wanted to present as legitimate derived not from the populus Romanus 
as a whole, but from the subset within it consisting of people who agreed with him. 
Meanwhile, every politician addressing a contio had to face the fact that the full populus 
Romanus was a larger and more diverse group than the populus Romanus who stood in front 
of him.  
 
The Roman definition of the public with reference to the populus makes the Roman public 
sphere, and Roman public opinion, more concrete than an Öffentlichkeit understood as a 
single legitimate notion of publicness and a single ‘public audience’ embedded in political 
culture. Unlike Habermas’s pure abstraction, in the end it is a large (and known) group of 
people. For Romans the abstract populus can only ever be singular, and as a result there can 
only be one legitimate public opinion. But the real populus and its opinions are at least 
potentially multiple. Despite the rhetorical and legal fiction that this audience in front of any 
given orator on any given day was exactly equivalent to the populus, and that the opinion 
they express constitutes the sole legitimate public opinion, everyone knew that there are other 
members of the populus, in other times and in other places.30 The populus here today might 
have a different opinion from the populus there tomorrow.31 The existence of such diverse 
                                                 
30 In private letters, as opposed to public speeches, Cicero and his correspondents do indeed break down the 
populus into different constituencies: e.g. Fam. 8.12.2-3; QF 2.4.5; see further Rosillo López 2017a: 155-70; 
Hurlet in this volume. 
31 Morstein-Marx 2004: 143-50 gathers some examples of moments when two groups of people or even 
formally-convened contiones in close proximity seemed to produce diametrically opposed opinions; see also 
Mouritsen 2001: 41. Politicians might indeed take advantage of the changing makeup of crowds; according to 
Plut. Vit. Ti. Gracch. 16, when Tiberius Gracchus’ elite supporters saw that he was about to lose his second 
tribunician elections because the wrong crowd had showed up, they dismissed the assembly and demanded a 
new one the next day. 
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instantiations of the populus is one reason that Cicero and Clodius argue not about what the 
populus thinks in general, or even over what any particular crowd thinks, but instead about 
whose audience is exactly identical to the true populus.  
 
In the pro Sestio, Cicero takes his argument to a dangerous extreme, drawing out its fullest 
implications. When maintaining that public opinion is entirely in his favour, and claiming 
never to have seen the slightest demonstration to the contrary, he asks: aliusne est aliquis 
improbis civibus peculiaris populus, cui nos offensi invisique fuerimus? “Or do those wicked 
citizens have some other populus of their own, which disapproves of and hates us?” (Sest. 
125). The answer he expects from his hearers is “No!” By definition there can be no such 
alternative populus, and the implication is that any such crowds must be either imaginary or 
disqualified. But the truth was that Clodius and his allies did indeed have their own peculiaris 
populus, as did any orator who summoned a contio: their audiences were composed of their 
partisans and might have had little overlap with Cicero’s, but they were still legally and 
rhetorically defined as the one and only populus Romanus. Cicero’s quip touches at the 
paradox and its consequences. The very concept of the true populus creates the spectre of the 
false populus. There can never be two populi, and the populus can never be split, but other 
versions of the populus always threaten to exist.32  
 
I use the word ‘threaten’ deliberately, because alongside using rhetoric of the populus 
Romanus’ indivisibility to disenfranchise alternative points of view, Roman politicians had 
another trick up their sleeve, and one which has not been so frequently analysed. They could 
use the slippages between the (various) real instantiation(s) of the populus and the ideal 
populus, between the opinion they imputed to a single gathering and the legitimizing force of 
public opinion, to threaten their opponents. This, more than anything else, comes close in 
effect to the modern politician’s slippery invocation of ‘public opinion’ as a weapon, though 
the concepts behind it are differently formed. 
 
                                                 
32 At pro Cluentio 137-8, Cicero remarks that ipse deinde populus Romanus qui L. Quincti fictis querimoniis 
antea concitatus rem illam et rogationem flagitarat, idem C. Iuni fili, pueri paruoli, lacrimis commotus maximo 
clamore et concursu totam quaestionem illam et legem repudiauit – ‘That very same populus Romanus that 
before, agitated by Lucius Quinctius’ false complaints, demanded that this case be prosecuted and a bill be 
brought, that same one was moved by the tears of Gaius Junius’ son, that poor little boy, and with great shouts 
and crowds denounced this court and law.’ His use of ipse and idem is meant to imply that one and the same 
crowd changed its mind, but his insistence on a singular populus Romanus even when different opinions are 
being displayed is notable. On the other hand, the phrase ipse or idem populus Romanus also contains within it 
the threat that there could be another. 
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For an example, I turn to Cicero’s speeches against Verres, and specifically the opening of 
the first speech of the second actio. Public opinion was at the heart of Cicero’s strategy in the 
speech: he wanted to convince the jurors that Verres was widely presumed guilty, that his 
guilt and the nature of the court system more widely was a matter of great public interest, and 
thus that acquitting him would bring a storm of controversy down on the jurors’ own heads. 
 
At the very beginning of the speech, Cicero introduces public opinion by claiming that it was 
widely thought that Verres would not turn up for trial. In the text we read, this is an ironic 
literary device: if the modern consensus is correct, Verres indeed did not turn up for trial, and 
this speech was never delivered. This presents no real difficulty for my approach: the 
arguments Cicero uses are prepared as if for a real trial, and demonstrate the kind of tactics 
available to a prosecutor whether or not they were actually used in this case. For my 
purposes, the important thing to note in these opening phrases is how Cicero describes the 
general feeling that Verres would not show: sermonem vulgi atque hanc opinionem populi 
Romani – “the talk of the crowd and the opinion of the populus Romanus” (Verr. 2.1.1). 
Where we would say “public opinion”, his double description tells us exactly whose opinion 
is meant: the populus. 
 
It does not seem a matter of great political import whether the populus think Verres will face 
his trial or not. But soon Cicero also ascribes to the populus Romanus opinions which are 
more politically inflammatory:  
accessi enim ad invidiam iudiciorum levandam vituperationemque tollendam, ut, cum 
haec res pro voluntate populi Romani esset iudicata, aliqua ex parte mea diligentia 
constituta auctoritas iudiciorum videretur (Verr. 2.1.5) 
I am here to reduce the hatred felt for the courts and to take away the criticisms made 
of them. My aim is that when this case has been decided in accordance with the wish 
of the populus Romanus, the authority of the courts will seem established, at least in 
some part by my hard work. 
Cicero introduces here an assumption that the case should be decided in accordance with the 
populus’s opinion, even though this was not a quaestio populi and the jurors were legally free 
to vote in accordance with their own consciences. What is more, he is perfectly clear about 
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what the populus’s opinion is, even though it has not been determined by a vote of any kind: 
they want to see Verres condemned.33 
  
The argument Cicero lays out in the opening paragraphs of the speech depends on shifting 
between the ideal populus Romanus and the actual people present on any one occasion. As 
and when it suits his purposes, he identifies both as the populus Romanus in its role as the 
producer of legitimate public opinion. At 2.1.29, he claims that the populus Romanus heard 
what he had to say in his speech in the first actio. He cannot be claiming that the populus as a 
whole heard him; nor, indeed, did the populus as an institution, properly convened by a 
magistrate for a contio or comitia. The group who heard him were the corona of onlookers 
who came to watch court cases on an entirely informal basis.34 But this incredibly selective 
and unrepresentative group had opinions, expressed them, and even had an effect on 
proceedings by doing so: at 2.1.12 Cicero ‘reminds’ the court that in the first actio Verres 
was clamore populi Romani infesto atque inimico excitatum – “shaken by the aggressive and 
hostile shouts of the populus Romanus”, and confessed that he had failed to behead the pirate 
chiefs. By naming the assembled crowd as the populus Romanus, he elevates them to official 
status and their shouts to the status of public opinion. Here, therefore, we see him play on the 
slippage between a given group of people and the populus, even in a situation where the 
crowd are not institutionally constituted as the populus at all. 
 
But at the heart of Cicero’s argument is another shift: between public opinion and the iussa 
populi, the will of the people. The will of the populus Romanus, when expressed through 
their votes in an assembly legally called by a magistrate, has legal force: it can create laws, 
elect magistrates, and (most importantly for Verres) condemn criminals. Mere shouts from 
the crowd cannot do so, but a skilled orator can turn shouts into a threat of legal action. The 
most blatant threat is at in Verrem 2.1.22: 
deinde etiam illud cogitare, quanto periculo venturi simus ad eos iudices quos propter 
odium nostri populus Romanus de nobis voluerit iudicare. (Verr. 2.1.22) 
                                                 
33 Grilli 2005: 132 points out that throughout the Verrines, Cicero defines the populus Romanus as distinct from 
the senate or the nobiles, a common feature elsewhere in his work (at Brut. 186-8, for example, populus is made 
equivalent to vulgus, meaning ‘the ordinary people’ as opposed to conoisseurs of oratory). But the force of his 
argument is based precisely around claiming that the populus’ opinion, and not that of his senatorial listeners, 
has legitimacy. 
34 On the influence of the corona, see Rosillo López 2017b. 
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Next, think too about this: how much danger we would face if we were to come 
before those judges whom, because of how much we are hated, the populus Romanus 
might wish should judge us. 
Cicero is claiming that if the jury do not condemn Verres, the populus Romanus are likely to 
vote to give the courts back to the equestrians, and the new equestrian juries will be harsher 
on senators, including Cicero himself and the current jurors. The populus Romanus’s wish 
must be heeded, because it can easily become reality.  
 
It is in a slightly earlier passage, however, that the second shift involved in this kind of threat 
becomes more apparent. Again, Cicero is talking about what might happen if Verres is 
acquitted. 
ex hoc quoque evaserit: proficiscar eo quo me iam pridem vocat populus Romanus;  
de iure enim libertatis et civitatis suum putat esse iudicium, et recte putat. confringat 
iste sane vi sua consilia senatoria, quaestiones omnium perrumpat, evolet ex vestra 
severitate: mihi credite, artioribus apud populum Romanum laqueis tenebitur. (Verr. 
2.1.12-13) 
Maybe he will escape that charge too. In that case, I will move on to what the populus 
Romanus is already asking me; it thinks that the power to judge cases of freedom and 
citizenship is its own, and it is right. So what does it matter if he let him us force to 
overrule senatorial deliberations, let him break free of all the quaestiones, let him 
escape your severity: believe me, he will be held in a tighter noose before the populus 
Romanus. 
 
Cicero will do what the populus Romanus are calling him to do: he will try Verres before the 
populus. When he claims that the populus Romanus are calling him, Cicero is appealing to 
the abstracted force of public opinion against Verres. He would like us to believe not that one 
or two men, or even the shouts of a single crowd, have asked him to prosecute, but that every 
single member of the populus Romanus shares that opinion. In the second sentence, however, 
apud populum Romanum refers to a different concept: a specific group of voters on a specific 
day, who, when defined by legal and rhetorical fiction as exactly identical to the populus 
Romanus, have the legal power to vote for Verres’ conviction in a trial apud populum.  
 
In the opening arguments of the speech taken as whole, Cicero takes advantage of two 
ambiguities in the way he uses the populus Romanus. Firstly, as so often, he shifts constantly 
 17 
between the imaginary all-inclusive populus Romanus and a specific group of people present 
on any given occasion. In addition, he shifts between the opinion he ascribes to the populus 
Romanus and the legally binding decisions of the populus Romanus. Taken together, these 
two shifts can be used to construct a complex threat: the opinions Cicero ascribes to the 
people present at the trial acquire the status of the legitimate opinion of the ideal populus 
Romanus, which he then threatens to turn into action.  
 
This rhetorical tactic is not confined to Cicero. Sallust ascribes a similar gambit to Memmius 
when he questions Jugurtha before a contio at Bellum Jugurthinum 33.3-4: 
quibus iuuantibus quibusque ministris ea egerit, quamquam intellegat populus 
Romanus, tamen uelle manufesta magis ex illo habere: si uerum aperiat, in fide et 
clementia populi Romani magnam spem illi sitam; sin reticeat, non sociis saluti fore, 
sed se suasque spes corrupturum. 
He said that the populus Romanus knew who had encouraged and helped him to do 
these things, but that even so they wanted to hear it openly from his own mouth. If he 
revealed the truth, he could hope for great things from the faith and mercy of the 
populus Romanus; but keeping silent would not help his allies and would destroy 
himself and his hopes. 
Here, where the relationship between the populus Romanus and an outsider is in question, the 
shift turns on ambiguities between the crowd present on the day, the ideal populus, and the 
state itself. The crowd is hostile to the king: we have already heard that they are demanding 
his imprisonment or execution. Memmius performs a show of quieting them, but their anger 
drives home the threat in his final words: if Jugurtha can appease these people, however, by 
answering Memmius’ questions, Memmius promises that his diplomatic relations with Rome 
itself will go more smoothly, and if not, he faces punishment. By morphing these men’s 
voices into the opinion of the populus Romanus as a whole, Memmius creates a kind of 
public opinion the legitimacy of which cannot be questioned and which can therefore easily 




Roman political discourse constructed the populus Romanus as the single source of legitimate 
public opinion. The operation of that process, and particularly the indivisibility of the 
populus, is in some ways reminiscent of Habermas’ (or, more broadly, German) 
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Öffentlichkeit; but at its core lies not an abstract notion of publicness or even an English 
concept of a public realm, but a real group of real people. In practical terms, that group could 
never be gathered together in one place at one time to tender their opinion, whether by voting 
or shouting, and as a result Roman politicians and their audiences together colluded in a 
fiction that a smaller group could be – not represent, but actually be – the populus Romanus. 
But the fiction itself led to problems: in theory, the populus Romanus should only have one 
opinion, but in practice different meetings produced different results.  As the duelling 
contiones of the supporters of Cicero and Clodius show, Cicero and his contemporaries could 
discount the “public opinion” on show on one occasion and privilege another by arguing 
about not what the true public opinion was, but which group was in fact the true populus. In 
the Verrines, on the other hand, Cicero plays on the slippage between what he claims is the 
general feeling of the people and the actual enactment of the sovereign populus Romanus’s 
wishes in a legally-constituted trial before the people.  
 
Roman Republican concepts of public opinion were inescapably linked to the populus 
Romanus, and the specific ways in which the populus Romanus was constituted and 
functioned in political discourse affected the roles what we would call “public opinion” 
played in politics. The conceptual indivisibility of the populus Romanus, when confronted 
with the ease with which a politician could draw a partisan crowd, generated a range of 
problems around public opinion which were subtly different from those we find today. For a 
great orator or political operator, however, all these problems were opportunities. If my 
examples show anything, it is that Romans – both orators and audience - were fully aware of 
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